[ G.R. No. 150664. September 03, 2009 ] 614 Phil. 216
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 150664. September 03, 2009 ]
VICENTE DACANAY, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF TERESO D. FERNANDEZ, PETITIONER, VS. HON. RAPHAEL YRASTORZA, SR., IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU, BRANCH 14, LUISSA ANNABELLA TORRANO SAMACO, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND RAUL SAMACO, ROBERTA I. KERSAW, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND BRYAN KERSAW AND JOHNSON MERCADER, RESPONDENTS. R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA, J.:
On July 14, 1992, petitioner Vicente Dacanay, as administrator of the testate estate of Tereso D. Fernandez, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City a case for recovery of real property against respondent spouses Luissa and Raul Samaco and Roberta and Bryan Kersaw.[1] On December 22, 1992, respondent spouses Samaco filed their answer with counterclaim.[2] On May 12, 1993, petitioner amended his complaint to implead respondent Johnson Mercader.[3] On August 3, 1993, respondent Mercader filed his answer with counterclaim.[4] Respondent spouses Kersaw were declared in default[5] as they did not file an answer despite service of summons by publication.[6] On May 15, 1994, petitioner filed his second amended complaint[7] which the court granted. On March 30, 1994, respondent spouses Samaco filed their answer with counterclaim,[8] while respondent Mercader filed his on May 30, 1994.[9] On December 12, 1995, the RTC dismissed[10] petitioner’s complaint for lack of merit. Petitioner was likewise ordered to pay P70,000 to respondent spouses Samaco and respondent Mercader by way of attorney’s fees,[11] litigation expenses[12] and moral damages.[13] Not satisfied, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).[14] On October 27, 1999, the CA[15] affirmed the RTC in toto. Petitioner then filed in the Supreme Court a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari. His motion was denied in a minute resolution[16] because of procedural lapses[17] on his part. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration met the same fate.[18] Consequently, the CA[19] and the Supreme Court[20] entered judgment on their rulings. Thus, the RTC decision dismissing petitioner’s complaint and holding him personally liable for P70,000 to respondent spouses Samaco and respondent Mercader became final and executory. On July 12, 2001, respondent Mercader filed a motion for execution[21] of the RTC decision. Petitioner opposed[22] the motion, contending that he should not be made personally liable for the amount awarded by the RTC. The RTC judgment should be considered as a claim against the estate of Tereso Fernandez. Thus, the writ of execution should be referred to the court where the estate of Tereso Fernandez was being settled. On August 30, 2001, the RTC granted respondent Mercader’s motion for execution.[23] According to the RTC, there was no impediment to the execution of its decision because it had already become final and executory. Moreover, considering that the decision sought to be executed “(did) not involve money claims,"[24] the writ of execution could not be directed against the estate of Tereso Fernandez. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration[25] went unheeded.[26] Refusing to give up, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari[27] in this Court. He reiterates his position that he should not be made personally liable to pay the P70,000 awarded by the RTC in favor of respondent spouses Samaco and respondent Mercader. At the outset, we note that petitioner filed his petition for certiorari directly in this Court. This is a violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. He should have filed his petition in the CA before seeking relief from this Court.[28] Thus, this petition can be dismissed outright for being procedurally infirm. Moreover, the petition lacks merit. The RTC decision sought to be executed has long attained finality. Hence, petitioner can no longer question it. Once a judgment attains finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable. A final and executory judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land.[29] This is the doctrine of finality of judgment. It is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments or orders of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law.[30] Otherwise, there will be no end to litigations, thus negating the main role of courts of justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.[31] The book of entries of judgment of the CA states that its decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 52731 on October 27, 1999 (which affirmed the RTC decision dismissing petitioner’s complaint and awarding P70,000 to respondent spouses Samaco and respondent Mercader) became final on June 22, 2000.[32] On the other hand, the book of entries of judgment of the Supreme Court states that its resolution in G.R. No. 143713 on August 9, 2000 (which denied petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file petition for review on certiorari) became final on February 14, 2001.[33] Thus, respondent Mercader properly moved for the execution of the RTC decision on July 12, 2001. For the same reason, there was no legal impediment to the RTC’s issuance of a writ of execution of its final and executory decision on August 30, 2001. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Puno, C.J., (Chairperson), Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro and Bersamin, JJ., concur.