[ AM No. MTJ-99-1178. March 03, 1999 ] 363 Phil. 446
EN BANC
[ AM No. MTJ-99-1178. March 03, 1999 ]
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE BUCO R. DATU-IMAN, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, BAYANG, LANAO DEL SUR, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This complaint was filed by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) against respondent Judge Buco R. Datu-Imam of the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bayang-Tubaran-Binidiyan-Butig-Lambatan-Marogong-Lumbayanagui (hereinafter referred to as Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bayang), Lanao del Sur,[1] for gross ignorance of the law for enjoining enforcement of a COMELEC directive issued in connection with the barangay elections of May 9, 1994 in Bayang, Lanao del Sur. It appears that, on March 29 and 31, 1994, the Commission on Elections sent telegrams to election officials in Lanao del Sur ordering them to delete Barangay Sumbago from the list of barangays in the Municipality of Bayang on the ground that it had not been legally created. Accordingly, the officials refused to accept for filing certificates of candidacy of those seeking office in Barangay Sumbago in the May 9, 1994 barangay elections. However, barangay officials seeking reelection brought suit (Civil Case No. 08-BA, Monadi, et al. v. Commission on Elections) in the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bayang to stop implementation of the COMELEC directive. Respondent, who had been designated acting judge of that court, issued a temporary restraining order on April 9, 1994 and, after hearing, rendered a decision on May 2, 1994 granting injunction. He held that a mere telegram order of the COMELEC cannot prevail over Executive Order No. 108, dated December 24, 1986, of then President Corazon C. Aquino which listed Sumbago among the barangays duly created in Region XII. By virtue of the temporary restraining order of respondent judge, the Election Officer of Bayang, Lanao del Sur allowed the filing of certificates of candidacy for barangay positions in Sumbago. However, upon being informed of the issuance of the order, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 94-2947, dated May 17, 1994, directing election officials to disregard the temporary restraining order and delete Barangay Sumbago from the list of barangays in the Municipality of Bayang, Lanao del Sur, as previously ordered. At the same time, the COMELEC referred the present case to this Court for “appropriate [disciplinary] action” against respondent. The COMELEC contended that, in taking cognizance of the case, respondent showed “patent ignorance of the law” because he had no power to issue an injunction against the COMELEC, especially “considering the status and rank of the issuing court in relation to that of the COMELEC."[2] On the other hand, respondent claimed in his comment that he issued the temporary restraining order in good faith on the basis of certifications that Barangay Sumbago had been given internal revenue allotments by the Department of Budget and Management and had been recognized by the DILG ARMM, Provincial DILG, Municipal DILG, and DBM Cotabato City. He claimed that he issued the injunction in question lest the residents of Barangay Sumbago be deprived of their right of self-government considering that it was the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy and that there were “ill-motivated persons who attempted to sow confusion and disorder in the barangay using the [COMELEC] telegram as a tool.” In its memorandum, dated January 26, 1999, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommends that the complaint against respondent judge be dismissed and that instead he simply be admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties. It appears that respondent compulsorily retired on December 7, 1998 from the service. He prays that a clearance be issued to him so that he can collect his retirement benefits, less any amount which “the Court may deem just, right, equitable, and reasonable.” He states that he is in dire need of the money for his medical care and for the educational expenses of his family. The issue in this case is whether respondent judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law for issuing an injunction against the COMELEC. We think he is, although, as will presently be explained, there are mitigating factors which should be considered in his favor. First of all, as already pointed out in a 1968 dictum,[3] because of their subordinate status and rank vis-a-vis the COMELEC, lower courts cannot issue writs of injunction enforceable against the COMELEC. More importantly, respondent ought to have known that, since its creation, the COMELEC has been accorded full discretion given its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.[4] This was stressed in the decision of this Court in Zaldivar v. Estenzo.[5] Quoting from its prior decisions, this Court held:
In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so may this court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created ¾ free, orderly and honest elections. . . . . [I]t is easy to understand why no interference whatsoever with the performance of the Commission on Elections of its functions should be allowed unless emanating from this Court. The observation of Acting Chief Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Albano v. Arranz [4 SCRA 386 (1962)], while not precisely in point, indicates the proper approach. Thus: “It is easy to realize the chaos that would ensue if the Court of First Instance of each and every province were to arrogate unto itself the power to disregard, suspend, or contradict any order of the Commission on Elections; that constitutional body would be speedily reduced to impotence."[6]
It is imperative that judges be conversant with basic legal principles.[7] Indeed, the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to “be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence."[8] However, respondent’s liability is somewhat mitigated by the fact that, as found by the OCA,
Respondent judge acted on the basis of the documentary evidence presented before him which he considered valid justification in taking cognizance of the case. These documents are Executive Order No. 108 retaining Sumbago as a barangay, and records from the DILG/ARMM, Provincial DILG, Municipal DILG and DBM showing that barangay Sumbago is an existing barangay. In fact, it has been funded by the DBM since 1993 with Bank Account No. 1262-1043-18.
Nor was the COMELEC without fault. As respondent pointed out in his decision, dated May 2, 1994, no representative of the COMELEC (the Provincial Election Officer and the Municipal Election Officer of Bayang, Lanao del Sur, who were named respondents in the case) appeared at any of the hearings set on April 21, 1994, April 26, 1994, and April 29, 1994 despite notice. It appears that no opposition to the petition for injunction was ever filed by the COMELEC. With respect to the first hearing on April 21, 1994, the record shows that the local election officers notified the COMELEC head office in Manila only on April 25, 1994. Upon being advised of the issuance of the TRO and the hearing on the writ of injunction, the COMELEC apparently did nothing except to tell its provincial officials to disregard the TRO and to delete Sumbago from the masterlist of barangays as previously ordered. The COMELEC could have filed an opposition and thereby save respondent from committing the error of issuing an injunction. It could have instituted certiorari proceedings in this Court to annul the proceedings conducted by respondent in Civil Case No. 08-BA and thus forestall the rendition of judgment against it. For, although respondent was presumed to know the constitutional limits of his authority, parties too have a responsibility to bring before him arguments and evidence for his consideration in the decision of the case. For the failure of the COMELEC to do so, respondent judge was deprived of the benefit of an adversary proceeding. Jeremy Bentham in effect described the relationship between the judge and counsel when he insisted that the law is not made by judge alone but by “Judge and Company.” Finally, in assessing the liability of respondent, account should be made of the fact that this appears to be his first administrative case in his entire judicial career which spanned thirteen years.[9] The Office of the Court Administrator recommends that respondent be simply admonished. We would agree with this recommendation in light of the mitigating factors above stated. However, inasmuch as respondent is now retired, an admonition would have no practical effect. A fine of P1,000.00 would seem to be the more appropriate penalty under the circumstances.[10] WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Buco R. Datu-Imam of the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bayang-Tubaran-Binidiyan-Butig-Lambatan-Marogong-Lumbayanagui, Lanao del Sur GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and IMPOSES on him a FINE of P1,000.00 to be deducted from retirement benefits due him. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur. Vitug, J., abroad on official leave. Panganiban, J., on leave.ment due to his failing health, and that he needed his papers to be processed as soon as possible, as he was in dire need of his retirement benefits. While maintaining his probity in the performance of his duties, he manifested that he was “willing that an amount be deducted from whatever retirement benefits he [would] receive that [may be] just and equitable in the premises."[9]
RECOMMENDATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR
In his Report, Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez, officer-in-charge of the Office of the Court Administrator, found the Complaint meritorious and recommended that a fine of P10,000 be imposed upon the respondent, viz:
“EVALUATION: After going over the records of the case, we find the instant administrative case to be impressed with merit. “In the case at bar, it is very evident that respondent sheriff was not able to successfully implement the Writ of Execution issued by the Court in Civil Case No. (93-05) 220. Although respondent sheriff executed a Document of Delivery dated February 24, 1995, attesting to the fact that complainants were placed in actual possession of the property in question, still, his Return of Service dated February 27, 1995 shows that the defendants were not removed from the subject premises because of their adamant refusal to vacate. As a matter of fact, in a Petition for Contempt of Court filed by the complainants, the MTC of Borongan, Eastern Samar, issued a decision dated July 14, 1995 finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Contempt of Court for their refusal to vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to the plaintiffs. “RULE 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
‘Section 13. How execution for the delivery, or restitution of property enforced. — The officer must enforce an execution for the delivery or restitution of property by ousting therefrom the person against whom the judgment is rendered and placing the judgment creditor in possession of such property and by levying as hereinafter provided upon so much of the property of the judgment debtor as will satisfy the amount of the judgment and costs included in the writ of execution.’
“Based on the foregoing provision, respondent sheriff is duty bound to fully enforce the writ by placing the judgment obligee in possession of the property involved and causing the judgment obligor to pay the monthly rentals as mandated in the decision concerned. Respondent sheriff should have continued to implement the writ of execution despite the adamant refusal of the parties to vacate the premises in question. “In the case of Fuentes vs. Leviste (117 SCRA 958), citing U.S. vs. Ramayat (22 Phil 183) the Court stated that:
‘Under Section 13, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, it is not enough for the sheriff, in the enforcement of a judgment for delivery or restitution of property, to merely direct the defeated party to surrender the property to the winning party to effect such delivery or restitution. The refusal of the defeated party to surrender the property to the winning party upon the order of the sheriff does not constitute contempt. The sheriff himself must oust the defeated party from the property and effect the delivery or restitution by placing the winning party in possession of the property.’
“A similar ruling was rendered in Chinese Commercial Company vs. Martinez, et. al (6 SCRA 648), where the Court held that:
‘xx under Section 8 (d) Rule 39, if the judgment be for the delivery of the possession of the property, describing it, to the party entitled thereto. This means that the sheriff must dispossess or eject the losing party from the premises and deliver the possession thereof to the winning party.’
“Respondent sheriff should have requested police assistance, if adamant refusal is present and he alone could not adequately enforce the judgment for the proper and immediate implementation of the subject writ, but he did not. The fact is that he has shown himself to be less than energetic and zealous in the performance of his duty. For a long period of time, the complainants have been deprived of their constitutional right to the enjoyment of their property mainly because of the negligence of the respondent sheriff. “Respondent ought to have known the correct procedure to be followed in order to ensure proper administration of justice, especially in its concluding stage. He failed to observe that degree of dedication to the duties and responsibilities required of him as sheriff. He is bound to discharge his duties with prudence, caution and attention which careful men usually exercise in the management of their affairs. The sheriff, an officer of the court upon whom the execution of a final judgment depends, must be circumspect and proper in his behavior. Execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law. (Eduarte v. Ramos, A.M. No. P-94-1069, November 09, 1994) “RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court recommending that: “1. The case be re-docketed as an administrative matter; and 2. A FINE in the amount of P10,000.00 be imposed upon respondent sheriff Juan R. Dulfo, Jr. to be deducted from whatever retirement benefits to which he may be entitled.”
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the findings and the recommendations of the Office of the Court Administrator.
Respondent Sheriff’s Responsibility and Liability
Sheriffs play an important part in the administration of justice, because they are tasked to execute the final judgments of courts. If not enforced, such decisions are empty victories on the part of the prevailing parties. Indeed, the execution of a final judgment is “the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law."[10] Thus, the sheriff charged with this task must act with considerable dispatch, so as not to delay the administration of justice.[11] The records show that the Writ of Execution addressed to Respondent Dulfo was issued on January 25, 1995 by the Municipal Trial Court (NTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar, pursuant to the November 23, 1994 MTC Decision and upon failure of the defendants, the Basada spouses, to post the requisite supersedeas bond. The Writ specifically directed respondent (1) to order the defendants to vacate the property and (2) to give to the complainants possession thereof.[12] The aforementioned two directives were consistent with Section 13 of Rule 39,[13] which at the time, read as follows:
“Sec. 13. How execution for the delivery or restitution of property is enforced. The officer must enforce an execution for the delivery or restitution of property by ousting therefrom the person against whom the judgment is rendered and placing the judgment creditor in possession of such property, and by levying as hereinafter provided upon so much of the property of the judgment debtor as will satisfy the amount of the judgment and costs included in the writ of execution.”
The declarations of respondent himself clearly show that he failed’ to implement this Writ. In his Document of Delivery dated February 24, 1995,[14] he manifested that he had complied with it, having delivered possession of the subject property to the complainants. However, in his Return of Service dated February 27, 1995,[15] he stated that the Basadas “adamantly refused to vacate the premises in question."[16] Notwithstanding this admission, he concluded: “In view thereof, for non-compliance of the parties concerned are subject to Rule 39, Section 9 of the Rules of Court. Writ is hereby returned satisfied.” (sic) Pursuant to the Writ and the Rules of Court, respondent should have ousted the Basada spouses from the subject house and lot. This he did not do. That they “adamantly refused” to vacate the premises was not an adequate excuse. Indeed, it was incumbent upon him to employ such means as may be reasonably necessary to enforce the Writ. The records show that he was accompanied and assisted by SPO3 Gregorio Almejas[17] and, together, they could have taken the necessary steps to implement the order fully. That it remained unenforced despite the presence of the police officer is a further testament to his dereliction of duty. The fact that he himself handed a copy of the Writ to the defendants and filed his Return of Service does not mean that he had discharged his duty. The essence of his job was to give the complainants full control and possession of the subject house and lot. But he miserably failed to do this. In his Comment to the Complaint, respondent insolently alleges that “[I]f the defendants are again residing therein, they must have reentered the property after the undersigned ha[d] placed the plaintiffs in possession thereof.” This allegation contradicts his Return of Service, wherein he admitted that the “parties adamantly refused to vacate the premises.” Clearly, Respondent Dulfo failed to observe the degree of dedication to the duties and responsibilities required of him as a sheriff.[18] Through his failure, he breached his sworn duty to uphold the majesty of the law and the integrity of the Justice system.[19] The Court cannot countenance such dereliction of duty, as it erodes the faith and trust of the citizenry in the judiciary. In Tisado v. Tablizo,[20] a sheriff who failed to enforce the Writ of Execution was suspended for six months, without pay. The Supreme Court held:
“The mere fact that defendants, in a threatening manner, prohibited respondent Trampe from entering the premises is no excuse for him to retreat and refuse to enforce the writ of execution. A deputy sheriff is a front-line representative of the justice system in this country. If he shows fear, or worse, is cowed by mere threats from enforcing the legitimate orders of courts, then by his cowardly act, he diminishes the judiciary. He erodes the faith and trust of the citizenry in the ability and capacity of the courts to settle disputes and to safeguard their rights. Specifically, he breaches his sworn duty to uphold the majesty of the law and the integrity of the justice system.”
In the present case, respondent sheriff’s offense is just as odious. In his explanation, he does not claim that he was threatened; he merely declares, as earlier noted, that the “parties adamantly refused to vacate the premises in question."[21] Furthermore, he failed to utilize the aid of the police officer, who was with him at the time for the specific purpose of enforcing the Writ. Worse, respondent has the temerity to declare that it was “returned satisfied.” Not only did he fall to enforce it; he also revealed a faulty grasp of the basic concepts and duties of his office. Thus, suspension of six months, the penalty meted to the respondent sheriff in Tisado v. Tablizo, should also be imposed on Respondent Dulfo. But in view of the respondent’s application for retirement which makes suspension inapplicable, the Court resolves instead to fine him in the sum of ten thousand pesos (P10,000), deductible from his retirement pay. WHEREFORE, Respondent Juan R. Dulfo is hereby found GUILTY of dereliction of duty and is ordered to pay a FINE in the sum of ten thousand pesos (P10,000), which will be deducted from his retirement benefits. SO ORDERED. Romero (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.