[ A.M. No. P-94-1063. December 17, 1996 ] 333 Phil. 517
EN BANC
[ A.M. No. P-94-1063. December 17, 1996 ]
BERNARDITA B. CHUA IN BEHALF OF ACCORD LOANS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. BENJAMIN A. GONZALES, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
On May 24, 1991, a writ of execution[1] was issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch III in Civil Case No. 90-166 entitled, “Accord Loans, Inc. v. Spouses Martin F. Nuñez & Elizabeth M. Nuñez, Godofredo Sanchez and Eduardo R. Tulfo,” for collection of a sum of money, addressed to the City Sheriff of Olongapo City commanding the latter as follows:
“THEREFORE, you are commanded to seize the goods and chattels of the said spouses Martin F. Nuñez and Elizabeth M. Nuñez, except such are by law exempt, and make sale thereof according to the law in such cases made and provided to the amount of the said judgment, together with your fees for the execution, and pay the amount so collected by you thereon to the Accord Loans, Inc., the plaintiff in said action to accept the amount of your fees thereon. In case sufficient personal property of the said spouses Martin F. Nuñez & Elizabeth M. Nuñez, cannot be found to satisfy the amount of such judgment, costs, interests and your fees thereon, you are ordered to levy upon the real estate of the said defendants and sell the same in the manner provided for by law, for the satisfaction of the balance of such judgment, costs, interests and your fees thereon; and the same returned to me within sixty (60) days upon receipt with your action. WITNESS THE HON. PEDRO T. LAGMAN, Presiding Judge of this Court this 24th day of May 1991 at Angeles City.
s/ Marlon P. Roque t/ MARLON P. ROQUE Clerk of Court III”[2]
Pursuant to the above writ, respondent Benjamin A. Gonzales, as Deputy Sheriff of Olongapo City, on July 25, 1991 levied on one (1) unit 20" colored television set worth P5,000.00 owned by the Spouses Martin F. Nuñez & Elizabeth M. Nuñez, the defendants in said case. Complainant alleged that her company found out about the execution of the writ only sometime in May 1994 through its client Spouses Nuñez. When asked about the execution, Sheriff Gonzales failed to produce the television set or to give the amount of P5,000.00 despite sufficient demands from him. Apparently, respondent Gonzales failed to accomplish the sheriff’s return of service and to submit the same before the court issuing the writ. On July 20, 1994, Bernardita Chua, as Branch Manager of Accord Loans, Inc., brought the instant complaint for grave misconduct against the respondent sheriff alleging the foregoing facts. In his defense, respondent, while admitting that he had taken possession of the television set on July 25, 1991, maintains that he totally forgot about the May 24, 1991 writ of execution when his apartment dwelling was destroyed due to the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo on July 15, 1991. During this period, he was unable to report to his office “due to the continuous volcanic activities that has (sic) affected his person.” He had not been reminded of the levy respecting the subject writ of execution until he received the administrative complaint on September 28, 1994.[3] Upon receipt of said complaint, however, he immediately repaired to the house of a certain Mr. Rodenio Diwa, Jr., with whom he allegedly entrusted the appliance for safekeeping. The latter voluntarily surrendered the item to him in good condition. Thus, he is now ready to deliver the TV set in obedience to the orders of this Court.[4] We find the defense of respondent Deputy Sheriff unworthy of credence. It appears that this is the third administrative complaint filed against Deputy Sheriff Benjamin A. Gonzales. His personal record (201 file) shows that: (1) By a resolution dated April 15, 1991, in A.M. No. P-87-64, entitled “Jaime Co vs. Benjamin Gonzales, Deputy Sheriff, Branch 49, Guagua, Pampanga,” respondent was (a) reprimanded for bringing and keeping the attached personal properties at his residence and at the house of his parent-in-law without prior consultation with his Officer-In-Charge and/or his Presiding Judge; and (b) reprimanded and imposed a fine equivalent to his three (3) months salary for not returning the attached personal property upon termination of his employment when his temporary appointment as Deputy Sheriff of Branch 49 was no longer renewed by his Presiding Judge and for returning the attached properties only after the Court has issued several orders for its return and for his arrest. (2) In A.M. No. P-91-469 (Victorino Fajota vs. Benjamin Gonzales, Deputy Sheriff, RTC, Branch 75, Olongapo City), Executive Judge Alicia Santos in her report and recommendation dated April 22, 1993, found respondent remiss in his duty by not making the proper return of the writ and for exercising his discretion by not levying the real property of the losing defendant in the forcible entry case. The Third Division of the Honorable Court in its Resolution, dated August 16, 1993, reprimanded and warned respondent that a similar act will be dealt with more severely in the future. Coming to the merits of the complaint, it is significant to note that Mt. Pinatubo erupted on June 15, 1991. The levy on execution over the television set was made on July 25, 1991, which is more than one (1) month after the eruption. Strangely enough, while the volcanic eruption did not prevent him from executing the writ, it caused him to forget his more urgent duty to file his return of service and/or to sell the property to satisfy the judgment debt as mandated by Section 11, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, viz:
“Return of writ of execution. - The writ of execution may be made returnable, to the clerk or judge of the court issuing it, at any time not less than ten (10) nor more than sixty (60) days after its receipt by the officer who must set forth in writing on its back the whole of his proceedings by virtue thereof, and file it with the clerk or judge to be preserved with the other papers in the case. A certified copy of the record, in the execution book kept by the clerk, of an execution by virtue of which real property has been sold, or of the officer’s return thereon, shall be evidence of the contents of the originals whenever they, or any part thereof, have been lost or destroyed.”
Respondent insists that he forgot all about the writ of execution until he was served the administrative complaint. The circumstances of this case as well as the irregular actuations of the respondent reveal that this is not a case of simple forgetfulness. In the affidavit[5] of Mr. Edwin Carreon, Collection Assistant of Accord Loans, Inc., it was stated that their company learned of the levy made by the respondent from the Spouses Nuñez sometime in May 1994, but Deputy Sheriff Gonzales failed to inform their office regarding the matter and likewise “failed to produce the goods he seized from Spouses Nuñez and/or to give the value thereof.” This administrative complaint was sworn to by Mrs. Bernardita Chua on July 20, 1994. Respondent avers, however, that he remembered the writ of execution only when he received a copy of the administrative complaint on September 28, 1994. The assertion of the complainant deserves weight when she stated in her affidavit-complaint[6] that previous demands were made upon the respondent for the delivery of the TV set or its value considering that this is the standard operating procedure in their kind of business. Hence, while respondent had more than one (1) month to produce the television set under the rules, he did not undertake the delivery, thus evincing a deliberate attempt on his part to retain the appliance for his own benefit. WHEREFORE, considering that this is his third offense in the performance of his duties as a Deputy Sheriff, respondent Benjamin A. Gonzales is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all leave credits and retirement benefits. He is disqualified from reemployment in the national and local governments, as well as in any government instrumentality or agency, including government-owned or controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory and respondent Deputy Sheriff is further ordered to cease and desist from discharging the functions of his office upon receipt of this Decision. Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of the respondent. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur. his insistence that the Court has no jurisdiction over the case, by setting the case for hearing and asking clarificatory questions. This would have elicited the DAR case and the resolution dated July 23, 1990. Respondent Judge did not do this. He proceeded to decide the case ordering the ejectment of defendants Quirino Sabio and Modesto Ualat. 3. Complainant Modesto Ualat faults the respondent Judge for ordering him and Quirino Sabio to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff Leonardo Coma ‘the current rentals at the rate of P18,000.00 per cropping season until plaintiff is restored in the possession of the land leased premises; and to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of P3,000.00’. The decision of respondent Judge does not state the reason for ordering Modesto Ualat to pay jointly and severally with defendant Quirino Sabio P18,000.00 to the plaintiff Leonardo Coma as rentals of the land until possession is restored to the plaintiff. From the record of the case, the available evidence on this point is the affidavit of Leonardo Coma that Quirino Sabio sublet a portion of 1.4 hectares of the land to Modesto Ualat. On the other hand, Quirino Sabio and Modesto Ualat alleged in their answer that Modesto Ualat entered and cultivated a portion of 4,000 square meters thinking that it is not part of the land in question. This is reiterated in the affidavit of Modesto Ualat. In his testimony, respondent Judge declared that he ordered Modesto Ualat to pay jointly and severally with Quirino Sabio the P18,000.00 to the plaintiff Leonardo Coma because they conspired to deprive the plaintiff of the rentals of his land. This is not supported by the evidence available from the record of the case and this is not stated in the decision of respondent Judge. Obviously, respondent Judge gave credence to the evidence of plaintiff that Quirino Sabio subleased a portion of 1.4 hectares of the land to Modesto Ualat. However, it is not correct to hold Modesto Ualat jointly and severally liable to the lessor Leonardo Coma for the current rentals of the land because a sublessee is only subsidiarily liable for rentals to the lessor. “Article 1652. The sublessee is subsidiarily liable to the lessor for any rent due from the lessee. However, the sub-lessee shall not be responsible beyond the amount of rent due from him in accordance with the terms of the sublease, at the time of the extra-judicial demand by the lessor.” (Civil Code) 4. The claim of complainant Quirino Sabio that he appealed the decision of respondent Judge to the RTC is not correct. The record of the case does not show that he appealed said decision. He admitted later in his testimony that it is only defendant Modesto Ualat who appealed the decision of respondent Judge. 5. Complainant Modesto Ualat faults respondent Judge for denying his appeal. The denial however, is correct. Atty. Marcelo C. Cabalbag, counsel of defendants, received copy of the decision on November 23, 1990 per Registry Return Card found on page 47 of the record of the case. He filed his notice of appeal dated January 17, 1991 for defendant Modesto Ualat which was received by the Court on January 21, 1991. Even if it is conceded that the notice of appeal was filed on January 17, 1991, it was clearly filed out of time. After the denial of his notice of appeal and the disqualification of his counsel, Modesto Ualat filed his own notice of appeal on April 27, 1991 which the Court received on January 17, 1991 (sic), it is obvious that the notice of appeal was filed late. Thus, the respondent Judge is also correct in denying this appeal of defendant Modesto Ualat. 6. The complainants alleged that respondent Judge has personal interest and motive on the land in dispute because thereafter, they discovered that the brother and son of respondent Judge intruded and cultivated portion of the land. Respondent Judge, admitted that his brother Rey Ramos took possession of and cultivated the land because he entered into a contract of lease with the landowner Leonardo Coma after the case was decided. After the termination of the lease with Rey Ramos, Leonardo Coma also entered into a lease contract with respondent’s son, Joscar Ramos, an accountant and a part-time farmer who does not live with the respondent Judge. According to respondent Judge, he had no hand in the contract between his son and Leonardo Coma as he has his own life to live. Considering the fact that there is no evidence that respondent Judge bent the facts and the law in order to decide the case in favor of the plaintiff, that his brother and son entered into a contract of lease after the case was already decided and the decision became final, and that as admitted by the complainants the respondent Judge has big hectares of land, the conclusion that respondent Judge has interest and personal motive on the land in dispute is not warranted. All told, of the several charges leveled against the respondent Judge, only one which charges him of committing an error in ordering Modesto Ualat jointly and severally liable with Quirino Sabio for the payment of the current rentals of the land is substantiated and found correct. This is, however, a mistake of judgment or law which every judge commits every now and then inspite of his earnest study of the law and honest application thereof to the facts of the case. Most probably, since the lease contract had already expired, the respondent Judge considered the act of Quirino Sabio in subleasing the portion of the land to Modesto Ualat and the latter’s cultivation thereof, as quasi-delict intended, as respondent Judge declared in his testimony, to deprive the landowner of the rental of his land. This is, however, inconsistent with his holding that Modesto Ualat is a sublessee."
In the same report, the Investigating Judge, among other things, recommended the dismissal of the complaint against respondent judge with a stern warning, however, that he should be more careful especially in those cases where a defendant claims to be the tenant of the land in question, and that he should conduct a preliminary hearing to determine whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the case.
Report of Court Administrator
In a Resolution dated June 25, 1996, this Court referred the aforesaid joint report and recommendation to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. In a Memorandum[10] addressed to the Chief Justice dated July 19, 1996, the Court Administrator disagreed with Judge Eduarte’s recommendation to dismiss the case, reasoning that “(t)he mere fact that respondent lacks prior knowledge or notice of the previous case before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board and its resolution of July 23, 1990 does not entirely absolved (sic) him of any administrative liability. It should be noted that in the civil case for Illegal Detainer with Damages pending before him, the separate affidavits of herein complainants contained allegation of landlord-tenant relationship and this information could have cautioned respondent in taking cognizance of the case at once. Prudence dictate (sic) that the proper thing to do under the circumstances is to refer first the case to the DAR for certification to determine the existence of the agricultural tenancy relationship in accordance with existing agrarian laws. His act of precipitately acting on the case without coursing the latter to the DAR has put into question his real motive especially so that his personal interest on the lot is what is concerned in this case.” Additionally, the Court Administrator cited P.D. 316[11] and P.D. 1038[12] which enjoin a fiscal or judge of any tribunal from taking cognizance of an ejectment case or any other case designed to harass or remove a tenant of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and/or corn unless the Secretary of Agrarian Reform certifies that the case is one proper for such tribunal to hear and decide. To support his recommendations, the Court Administrator cited the case of Puertollano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,[13] where this Court ruled that “(i)t is mandatory for the trial court to refer the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his authorized representative for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the contending parties if it is a case of ejectment or attempt to harass or remove a tenant in agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn. Even without a motion, the trial court may motu propio order such referral.” (Italics supplied). The Court Administrator recommended that a fine of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) be imposed upon respondent Judge with a warning of graver penalty for similar acts in the future.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the Court Administrator. The Investigating Judge may have been technically correct in averring that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint.[14] However, this is an administrative case where the issue is not whether a motion to dismiss the complaint could prosper. The issue is whether respondent judge properly comported himself in the face of the obvious matters brought before him. As can be readily seen from the answer filed by complainants Sabio and Ualat in the civil case, they alleged the existence of an agrarian tenancy relationship between themselves and the landowner. Additionally, in the proceedings before respondent judge, complainants were even represented by a lawyer from the DAR. These matters should have been sufficient to put respondent Judge on notice that complainants were claiming protection under our agrarian laws. At that point, he ought to have realized that there existed a genuine issue involving agricultural tenancy among the parties with respect to the subject property. Knowledge of existing agrarian legislation and prevailing jurisprudence on the subject, together with an ordinary degree of prudence, would have prompted respondent Judge to refer the case to the DAR for preliminary determination of the real nature of the parties’ relationship, as required by law. At the very least, as suggested by the Investigating Judge, respondent could have himself conducted a clarificatory hearing to determine such relationship. The last thing he should have done was to proceed to take cognizance of the case in the absence of such referral. In the face of these established facts, he could not hide behind the ostrich-inspired defense of his jurisdiction being determined by the allegations in the complaint. Indeed, the complaint was prepared by Leonardo Coma, who found it to his interest to hide the possible existence of the tenancy relationship, even while he knew of the earlier complaint filed against him before the DARAB. In the case of Ocier vs Court of Appeals,[15] we reiterated the ruling we made in Puertollano in this wise:
“Private respondent, in her original complaint before the lower court, alleged that petitioner violated the Land Reform Code and could be ejected under P.D. 816. Petitioner answered that he was a tenant of private respondent. There was, at that point in time, no need for referral to the Department of Agrarian Reform as the landowner-tenant relationship was admitted. However, when private respondent’s amended complaint – where she alleged violation of a civil law lease agreement – was admitted, the issue of actual tenancy – raised by petitioner in both his Answer and Amended Answer – had to be referred to the Department of Agrarian Reform for determination as this was now a genuine issue.”
His failure to refer the case to the DAR upon receipt of the answer of complainants, despite the clear mandate of the two agrarian laws aforementioned and our ruling in Puertollano, can in no wise be justified by respondent judge. What is even more embarrassing is his seeming lack of awareness of the Civil Code provision making a sub-lessee merely subsidiarily liable for unpaid rentals, to the extent of the rentals due from him under the sub-lease, at the time of the lessor’s extrajudicial demand. It is a pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with the law and changes therein, as well as with the latest decisions of this Court. One cannot seek refuge in having a mere cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one – certainly not judges. IGNORANTIA JURIS QUOD QUISQUE SCIRE TENETUR NON EXCUSAT.[16] When the law is elementary, so elementary, not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[17] Finally, we note that respondent judge had previously been held liable[18] for gross ignorance of the law and dereliction of duty, and imposed a “reasonable” fine of P10,000.00, it being his first infraction in his 35 years in the government service, 27 of which were in the judiciary. This case being thus his second infraction, he is meted the maximum penalty of P20,000.00 fine, with a warning that a repetition will be dealt with more severely. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent judge is hereby FOUND LIABLE for gross ignorance of the law and is hereby imposed a fine in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). Respondent is further ADMONISHED that commission of the same or similar act in in the future will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED. Narvasa C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.