[ G.R. No. 98472. August 19, 1993 ] 296-A Phil. 427
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 98472. August 19, 1993 ]
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. (PASEI), PHILIPPINE ENTERTAINMENT EXPORTERS AND PROMOTERS ASSOCIATION (PEEPA), AND ASSOCIATION OF FILIPINO OVERSEAS WORKERS, INC. (AFOWI), PETITIONERS, VS. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, RESPONDENTS, JOBLINK INTERNATIONAL, INC. (HEREIN REPRESENTED BY FEBI L. ENRIQUEZ, VICE PRESIDENT FOR OPERATIONS) AND PROSPECS INTERNATIONAL CONSULTANCY (HEREIN REPRESENTED BY QUINTIN C. FENIZA, PROPRIETOR-GENERAL MANAGER), INTERVENORS, RP-JAPAN ENTERTAINMENT PROMOTERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (REPA), INTERVENOR, AMADER INTERNATIONAL, INC., IDG TRADING & GENERAL SERVICES, PHILCANGO INTERNATIONAL RECRUITMENT SERVICES, PAN ASIA MANPOWER PLACEMENT, LYKA INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES, INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES, MAINLINE RECRUITMENT INTERNATIONAL, INC., WORLD MATRIX UNLIMITED SERVICES CONSULTANCY & TRADING CO., NUBA INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES CORPORATION, EL BARY MANPOWER SERVICES, SOCIAL SERVICES CONT. INT’L CO. LTD., CDD ENTERPRISES AND VELREY RECRUITMENT COMPANY, INTERVENORS. D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
May an Executive Order (EO)[1] repeal a Letter of Instruction (LOI)?[2]
Ordinarily, since both LOI and EO are presidential issuances, one may repeal or otherwise alter, modify or amend the other, depending on which comes later. The case before us appears compounded by the circumstance that the LOI in question was issued by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was clothed with legislative power, while the EO revoking the LOI was issued by then President Corazon C. Aquino at a time when she had already lost her law-making power after Congress convened on 27 July 1987.[3] Although the EO issued by President Aquino is undoubtedly not a law but a mere administrative issuance, the parties here debate whether the LOI issued by President Marcos was a law or simply an administrative rule in view of his dual position then as chief executive and as legislative authority. Petitioners contend that the LOI is a law, hence, the EO cannot countermand it, while public respondent claims that the LOI is only an administrative issuance which may be superseded by an EO.
In determining whether a presidential issuance under the 1973 Constitution may be considered a law, we held in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile[4] that “[t]o form part of the law of the land, the decree, order or LOI must be issued by the President in the exercise of his extraordinary power of legislation as contemplated in Section 6 of the 1976 Amendments to the Constitution, whenever in his judgment there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasan Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action x x x x Verily, not all LOI issued by the President should be dignified into forming part of the law of the land.”
Article 25 of the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. 442, as amended)[5] encourages private sector participation in recruitment and placement of workers under guidelines, rules and regulations to be issued by the Secretary of Labor. On 20 January 1982, President Marcos issued LOI 1190 withholding the grant of new licenses to operate agencies for overseas employment effective 1 January 1982 except as he may otherwise direct.[6] On 19 March 1991, President Aquino issued EO 450 lifting the ban on new applications for licenses to operate recruitment agencies subject to guidelines and regulations the Secretary of Labor may promulgate.[7] On 8 April 1991, respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment promulgated Department Order (DO) No. 9, Series of 1991, entitled “Guidelines Implementing Executive Order No. 450.”
In this Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order filed 14 May 1991 petitioners Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), Philippine Entertainment Exporters and Promoters Association (PEEPA), and Association of Filipino Overseas Workers, Inc. (AFOWI) pray that EO 450 be declared invalid for being contrary to LOI 1190.
On 16 May 1991, we issued a temporary restraining order directing respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment to cease and desist from enforcing EO 450 and DO 9 until further orders.[8] Thereafter, three motions for intervention were filed,[9] which the Court eventually allowed.[10] Intervenors Joblink International, Inc. (JOBLINK), Prospecs International Consultancy, Amader International, Inc. (AMADER), IDG Trading & General Services, Philcango International Recruitment Services, Pan Asia Manpower Placement, International Manpower Services, Lyka International Manpower Services, Mainline Recruitment International, Inc., World Matrix Unlimited Services Consultancy & Trading Co., Nuba International Manpower Services Corporation, El Bary Manpower Services, Social Services Cont. Int’l Co., Ltd., CDD Enterprises and Velrey Recruitment Company, all applicants for new licenses, support the position of respondent that LOI 1190 was not a law.
On the other hand, intervenor RP-Japan Entertainment Promoters Association, Inc. (REPA), a non-stock, non-profit domestic corporation composed of private employment agencies authorized to recruit and deploy contract workers abroad, prays for the modification of the restraining order we issued on 16 May 1991. We addressed this incident on 4 July 1991 when we explained that our temporary restraining order did not comprehend renewal of existing licenses since EO 450 covered only new applications.[11] The other pending issue relating to the lifting and modification of our Resolution of 16 May 1991 will accordingly be resolved in this decision.
First, on the challenge of intervenors AMADER, et al., that petitioners lack locus standi, we need only reiterate that the “proper-party” requirement is satisfied if it is alleged that petitioners and intervenors have sustained or are in danger of sustaining immediate injury resulting from the acts or measures complained of.[12] Petitioners PASEI and PEEPA allege that their member agencies, which enjoy protection against competition by new licensees pursuant to LOI 1190, will suffer irreparable injury with the repeal of LOI 1190 by EO 450, considering further that there is no additional demand for Filipino workers abroad. Hence, any gain made by the new agencies on the supposed exclusive preserve of existing agencies necessarily results in the latter’s loss.
But, as regards petitioner Association of Filipino Overseas Workers, Inc. (AFOWI), we are not persuaded that the proliferation of recruitment agencies will necessarily result in exposure of workers to exploitation by unscrupulous recruiters, for the stiffer competition may even compel these agencies to seek better terms and conditions for overseas workers. Hence, the petition being founded on mere speculation insofar as it affects AFOWI, the same should be dismissed for want of a valid cause of action.
On the issue raised by intervenors that the petition can be decided without touching on the validity of EO 450, we cannot find any other way but to meet the question squarely since petitioners’ relief depends on its validity.
The central thesis of the petition is that LOI 1190 was issued pursuant to the law-making power of the President under Sec. 6 of the 1976 Amendments to the 1973 Constitution in response to “a grave emergency which cried for immediate and decisive action,” hence, should be considered part of the law of the land. Petitioners argue that because of its repealing or modifying effect on Art. 25 of the Labor Code, LOI 1190 could be valid only if treated as a law, and that a contrary interpretation that would render LOI 1190 invalid could not have been intended by the then incumbent President.
As we view it, LOI 1190[13] simply imposes a presidential review of the authority of the Minister of Labor and Employment to grant licenses, hence, directed to him alone. Since this is undoubtedly an administrative action, LOI 1190 should properly be treated as an administrative issuance. Unlike Presidential Decrees which by usage have gained acceptance as laws promulgated by the President, Letters of Instruction are presumed to be mere administrative issuances except when the conditions set out in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile exist. Consequently, to be considered part of the law of the land, petitioners must establish that LOI 1190 was issued in response to “a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasan Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter.” The conspicuous absence of any of these conditions fortifies the opinion that LOI 1190 cannot be any more than a mere administrative issuance.
In arguing that LOI 1190 was issued to cope with “a grave emergency,” petitioners point to the 3rd “Whereas” clause which speaks of the concern of the state against cut-throat competition seriously affecting the integrity and viability of the overseas recruitment industry, and the difficulty in the regulation and supervision of agencies and the protection of the welfare of the workers. The petitioners’ appraisal that the 3rd “Whereas” clause manifests a grave emergency situation is as good as anybody else’s contrary view. Moreover, even if we treat as emergency the “situation which has seriously affected the integrity and viability of the overseas employment industry,” there is no indication that in the judgment of the President it is grave.
Petitioners argue that since the repeal of Art. 25 of the Labor Code could not be done through an administrative issuance, LOI 1190 must of necessity be a law. This reasoning is flawed.
There is nothing in the LOI which repeals or runs counter to Art. 25 of the Labor Code, as amended. Instead, contrary to the perception of petitioners, LOI 1190 does not actually ban the grant of licenses nor bar the entry of new licensees since anybody could still apply for license with the Minister of Labor and Employment, although the grant thereof is subject to the prior authority of the President. In fact, the LOI did not modify the rule-making power of the Minister of Labor and Employment under the Labor Code; it only added another tier of review.
Neither can petitioners consider this additional review by the President as an amendment of Art. 25, for this is within the scope of the exercise of his constitutionally sanctioned control over the executive departments of government.[14] Implicit in that power of control is the President’s “authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries."[15] Moreover, if we discern the intent of LOI 1190 from the manner it was enforced, the unrebutted allegation of respondent - that 319 private employment agencies secured administrative presidential approval from 1982 to 1989[16] - shows that then President Marcos merely intended to regulate, and not ban altogether, new applications for licenses. For this reason, Marcos could not have contemplated repealing Art. 25 of the Labor Code.
Petitioners advance a rather outrageous interpretation of LOI 1190 when they claim that “[t]he then President was in effect saying that ‘Art. 25 of the Labor Code is hereby repealed as regards overseas workers until I otherwise direct.’"[17] By their nature, and their purpose to maintain stability in the polity, laws have a certain degree of permanence such that they are not intended to be repealed one hour after their enactment, then re-enacted the following hour, and so on. If the law has to be applied on a case to case basis, as in the case of Art. 25 of the Labor Code, it does not have to undergo the tedious process of repeal and re-enactment every time its application is warranted.
Petitioners would impress upon us the interpretation that LOI 1190 suspended the effectivity of Art. 25, which could not be done because the chief executive is constitutionally bound to “ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."[18] As we earlier stated, the LOI did not suspend the enforcement of Art. 25 of the Labor Code; it merely added another level of administrative review.
The discussion on whether the word “I” in the phrase “except as I may otherwise direct” refers to the President as chief executive or as a legislator is meaningless, for the correct interpretation would ultimately depend on whether the LOI is a law or an administrative issuance.
Petitioners also contend that EO 450 cannot repeal LOI 1190 for Congress has not delegated that power to the President.[19] We do not agree. There is no need for legislative delegation of power to the President to revoke the LOI by way of an EO in view of our finding that LOI 1190 is a mere administrative directive,[20] hence, may be repealed, altered or modified by EO 450, and DO 9 must consequently be upheld.
Of the three (3) groups of intervenors, only AMADER, et al., pray for attorney’s fees claiming that they were compelled to hire counsel to enforce and protect their rights. However, in view of the complexity of the legal issue involved, the Court resolves not to grant attorney’s fees.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order we issued on 16 May 1991 is accordingly LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Executive Order No. 450 and Department Order No. 9 of the Department of Labor and Employment are SUSTAINED. Accordingly, Letter of Instruction No. 1190 is declared REPEALED and SUPERSEDED by Executive Order No. 450.
SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, Quiason, Puno, and Vitug, JJ., concur.